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OVERVIEW
+ Definition and basics
+ Reality check
+ Implications for doctrine / enforcement
+ Why antitrust?
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DEFINITION
The application of empirical 
behavioral findings to antitrust law 
and policy
+ Examining the antitrust implications of 
recognizing the bounded rationality of real 
consumers, business managers, regulators, 
and courts 
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THE BASICS: RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS 
Antitrust law aims to protect competition 
among rational suppliers to satisfy the 
demands of rational consumers
+ Familiar with respect to suppliers (e.g., Matsushita, 
Brooke Group), which are assumed to be rational 
profit-maximizers
+ While the basic consumer building block is only 
occasionally noted (e.g. Brown University), with little 
consideration of the significance of its rationality 
assumption for antitrust
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THE BASICS: RATIONAL CONSUMERS
The standard approach assumes a great 
deal about consumers…
+ Rational consumer beliefs
+ Rational consumer preferences
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THE BASICS: RATIONAL BELIEFS 
+ No systematic biases/errors of 
judgment
+ No biased estimates of product quality
+ No mistaken judgments of absolute or relative 
prices
+ No erroneous predictions of one’s own future 
needs / preferences (demand)
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THE BASICS: RATIONAL CHOICE
+ Consistent choice behavior
+ Complete and orderly preferences
+ Standard axioms of rational choice
+ E.g., Transitivity, Dominance, Regularity (IIA)
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THE BASICS: REAL CONSUMERS…
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THE BASICS: BOUNDED RATIONALITY (BR)
+ Limited cognitive resources (Simon)
+ Judgment and decision making under 
uncertainty
+ Reliance on heuristics, environmental cues
+ Impact of motivation and emotion
+ Social preferences
Systematic, predictable deviations from 
(hypothetical) perfect rationality
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THE BASICS: BR CONSUMERS
+ Systematic consumer bias
+ Constructed consumer choice 
+ Particularly in the presence of 
sophisticated sellers that exploit 
consumers’ bounded rationality
+ Behavioral Industrial Organization
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THE BASICS: BR MANAGERS—FIRMS
Firms designed to maximize profits, but…
+ Human managers—agency problems
+ Limits of incentives and motivation 
+ Expertise helps, to a degree
+ Intrafirm selection beyond pure competence
+ Commitment, overconfidence
+ “Organizational repairs” for routine tasks only
+ Board monitoring/guidance
+ Small group limits; managerial influence
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THE BASICS: BR MANAGERS—MARKETS
In typical antitrust settings: 
+ Competitive discipline obviously 
constrained… 
+ And can reward some BR when operates (e.g., entry)
+ Arbitrage often impractical 
+ Identifying errors and learning from them is 
difficult
Hence, firms better approximate 
rationality, but only imperfectly
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QUESTIONS SO FAR?
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REALITY CHECK:
A MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT AND 
PREDICTION OF MARKET BEHAVIOR
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REALITY CHECK:  
HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
+ The real world is “sticky”
+ Established patterns of market behavior more stable 
then standard models predict
+ Norms, status quo bias/loss aversion, etc.
+ Managerial incentives 
+ Suboptimal collaboration (e.g., information 
sharing) among rival oligopolists
+ Higher likelihood and stability of cartels in 
some market settings  
+ Much evidence from criminal enforcement
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REALITY CHECK:  
MARKET POWER
+ Not always fully exploited
+ Reputation with consumers, social norms
+ Somewhat “sticky” market shares 
+ Particularly in consumer goods
+ Efficacy of rebates, loyalty programs etc.
+ Boundedly rational entry
+ Higher rates of entry than assumed 
+ But very low success rate, limited mobility 
+ Limited short term impact on established incumbents
+ But important long term source of innovation
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REALITY CHECK: 
MONOPOLIZATION
+ Seemingly irrational predation (e.g., 
recoupment unlikely) can be rational in fact
+ Investment in predatory reputation with asymmetric 
information
+ Boundedly rational predation possible in 
certain circumstances 
+ Competition over market share / relative position 
+ Loss averse dominant firms losing market share 
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REALITY CHECK:  
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
+ Interbrand: Tying, bundling
+ May offer somewhat more effective foreclosure in 
consumer markets due to consumer inertia (status 
quo bias etc.)
+ Intrabrand: Minimum RPM
+ Mfrs. tend to use excessively 
+ Overestimate harms of price cutting, prefer to control 
retail prices, and more
+ To their own detriment and that of discount retailers
+ Consumer harm only if pervasive in market or mfr. 
has market power (limited substitutes) 
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REALITY CHECK:  
MERGERS
+ Generally
+ Many mergers fail to add value 
+ Agency problems, managerial hubris
+ Efficiencies often overstated
+ Necessary to justify, desirability bias etc.
+ Accounting for boundedly rational entry
+ Horizontal 
+ Coordinated effects may be underestimated
+ Cf. criminal collusion cases
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QUESTIONS SO FAR?
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IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINE AND 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
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IMPLICATIONS: THE VALUE OF CASE-
SPECIFIC EVIDENCE 
+ Horizontal restraints 
+ The Matsushita SJ threshold
+ Monopolization
+ Recoupment (Brooke Group / Weyerhauser)
+ Merger enforcement
+ Demand estimation—consumer surveys; simulations
+ Entry
+ Rapid entry
+ Future entry: sufficiency, actual history
+ Efficiencies skepticism  
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IMPLICATIONS: (REASONABLY) SIMPLE 
ANTITRUST RULES FOR A COMPLEX 
BEHAVIORAL WORLD
+ Structuring RPM’s ROR
+ Recognizing the prevalence of BR RPM besides 
traditional pro- and anti-competitive uses
+ Per se illegality/legality / unstructured ROR unjustified
+ Leegin factors matter (also for behavioral reasons)
+ Burden on P to show them or direct harm (output reduction)
+ D can rebut, showing RPM necessary to address harm / 
undermine P’s main case
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IMPLICATIONS: SUMMARY
+ Greater concern for false negatives when 
courts / agencies rely on rationality 
assumptions to ignore factual evidence
+ Improving agency investigations / analysis
+ Tipping the scales in favor of one of the 
limited number of available rules
+ Helping refine structured inquiries under 
existing rules
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QUESTIONS SO FAR?
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Competition  Efficiency
Welfare
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1. Competition still (mostly) performs
2. More competition is (usually) better 
than its alternatives 
WHY ANTITRUST? 
REHABILITATING ANTITRUST
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WHY ANTITRUST?
COMPETITION (MOSTLY) PERFORMS (I)
+ Despite prevalent consumer bias
+ Some product markets still reasonably approximate 
standard model
+ Heterogeneity in rationality can reduce market 
effects of bias (when substantial minority 
approximates rationality)
+ Deviations diminished where learning / incentives to 
educate consumers exist
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WHY ANTITRUST?
COMPETITION (MOSTLY) PERFORMS (II)
+ Substantial fraction of approximately-rational 
preferences remains
+ Within consumers
+ Some extant preferences
+ Many constructed “final” preferences depend on higher-
order, more “authentic” preferences
+ Across consumers








(fewer firms w/more market power) 
or
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I.  Identify market conditions that determine  
effects of competition 
 Some markets sufficiently approximate standard model
 On occasion (more) regulation may perform better
 Would greater MP sometimes outperform competition?
II.  Relate above market conditions to policy
 Inform antitrust rules / boundaries
 Tolerate dominance more in some settings? (cf.
natural monopoly)
 Support deference to market-specific regulation? 
 Innovation and competition—less deference to IP?
FINAL WORDS: ANTITRUST AGENDA
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THANK YOU!
FOR MORE IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS SEE
MY AUTHOR PAGE
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